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Abstract. What is the role of presidents in the politics of distribution in developing democracies? To what 
extent do other political actors, such as legislators and governors, influence federal distribution? This paper 
studies the main factors that affect distributive politics in Argentina and Brazil, two highly unequal presidential 
federations in Latin America. The focus is on funds with high redistributive impact and over which the central 
government has large discretion: those for public infrastructure. Using original data on federal infrastructure 
spending for the 24 provinces in Argentina and the 27 states in Brazil for the period 1999-2011, we show that 
the distribution of infrastructure funds is fundamentally determined by executive politics. Despite this, our 
empirical findings indicate there is large variation between the two cases in the relevance of the partisan 
links between presidents and governors and the influence of congress and its committees. Furthermore, we 
observe that elections are not relevant in explaining distribution in either of the two cases and that presidents 
are mostly motivated by political considerations and that programmatic factors, such as equity and efficiency 
criteria, play a secondary role, especially in Argentina. We discuss some possible reasons for these results and 
their implications for the broader comparative debate on distributive politics.
Introduction
 
What is the role of presidents in the politics of dis-
tribution in developing democracies? To what ex-
tent do other political actors, such as legislators 
and governors, influence federal distribution? Do 
the political linkages between presidents, legisla-
tors, and state politicians (governors) shape the 
politics of federal distribution? This paper tries to 
identify in what ways and to what extent some of the 
most powerful actors in a presidential federal sys-
tem (presidents, legislators, and governors) influ-
ence the allocation of non-earmarked federal funds.
Although most researchers recognize a crucial role 
of these political actors, we are limited in our under-
standing of the factors that shape distribution. As 
Lindbeck and Weibull stated almost thirty years ago, 
“[t]he driving forces behind government-induced 
redistributions of income and wealth are still not 
well understood” (1987, 273). We believe that these 
limitations in knowledge are still present, particu-
larly in very unequal developing countries where 
redistribution has historically been a sensitive and 
politically divisive issue.
Existing scholarship studies the federal resource 
allocation across regions by focusing almost exclu-
sively on the role of congress and its internal ope-
rations, such as committee composition and par-
tisan configuration. Most of these studies analyze 
proactive legislatures, such as the U.S. congress. 
However, more recently, some studies have begun 
to explore the influence presidents have over the 
allocation of federal outlays (Larcinese et al., 2006; 
Berry et al., 2010). Fewer studies explore whether 
district-level factors are relevant to “pull down” re-
sources from the central government and even fewer 
works examine the role of governors in the politics 
of distribution in developing federal democracies.
In contrast, studies on reactive congresses, such as 
the majority of those in Latin America (Morgenstern 
and Nacif, 2002), have mostly concentrated on how 
the institutional and partisan powers of presidents 
influence distributive politics and force cooperation 
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from congress. The literature on the relationship be-
tween congress and the executive branch has main-
ly focused on coalition politics, cabinet formation, 
president-government party relations, and legisla-
tive career patterns (see Bonvecchi and Scartascini, 
2014). Part of this literature has also recognized the 
electoral and legislative relevance of governors in 
shaping national policymaking (Gibson, 2004; Wib-
bels, 2005; González, 2010; Falleti et al., 2013).
There is some agreement in the literature that go-
vernors are powerful actors in their districts and 
influential in federal politics in Argentina (De Luca 
et al., 2002; Jones, 2002; Jones and Hwang, 2005; 
Calvo and Micozzi, 2005; González, 2010; Falleti et 
al., 2013). However, there are very few observational 
analyses that empirically test the actual influence go-
vernors have over the distribution of particular trans-
fers or federal funds. The literature on Brazil shows 
more disagreement over the role governors effecti-
vely have in shaping federal politics in general, and 
the distribution of federal funds in particular. Some 
scholars claim that governors are powerful actors in 
their districts and that they have been influential 
at the federal level, especially before 1994 (Abru-
cio, 1998; Mainwaring, 1999; Ames, 2001; Samuels, 
2003; Samuels and Mainwaring, 2004; Ames et al., 
2005), while others claim that they have lost this 
power, particularly after 1994 (Cheibub and Limongi, 
2002; Figueiredo and Limongi, 2000; Hagopian et al., 
2008; Montero, 2009; Zucco, 2008; Fenwick, 2009; 
Borges, 2011). Despite these divisions, most empi-
rical studies have analyzed the relationship between 
presidential power and congress. In this paper, we 
empirically examine in what ways and to what extent 
presidents, legislators and governors influence the 
allocation of non-earmarked federal funds in Brazil, 
and compare the results to those in Argentina to ex-
plain differences between the two cases. 
We study the political economy of the allocation of 
highly redistributive and non-earmarked discretio-
nary federal funds. Discretionary funds are those 
that are not allocated following a particular legal 
framework. Hence, we exclude from our analysis 
legally mandated and earmarked funds. Redistribu-
tive funds are those that can generate potentially 
large economic and social externalities in the loca-
lities or regions where they are invested. Based on 
this decision, we concentrate our analysis on public 
infrastructure, a policy tool in hands of govern-
ments that most scholars in the literature consider 
crucial to stimulate economic growth and correct 
territorial inequality, because it is labor intensive 
and tends to generate large positive economic ex-
ternalities where allocated. The regional distribu-
tion of infrastructure funds is a mechanism through 
which to redistribute money from the regions that 
pay taxes that finance these funds to others in which 
the investment is actually made (Sollé Ollé, 2010). 
The relevance of studying the allocation of infrastruc-
ture funds in these two cases is twofold. First, these 
are crucial funds central governments have to correct 
territorial inequality.4 Second, these territorially re-
distributive funds have increased substantially in the 
last decade - from over 108% in real terms in Brazil 
to 429% in Argentina - becoming one of the most 
important redistributive tools in the hands of the 
central government.5 On the other hand, the presi-
dent has discretionary power over their allocation. 
Presidents’ discretion over the territorial allocation 
of infrastructure investment tends to be larger than 
in revenue-sharing schemes (Bonvecchi and Lodo-
la, 2011). This is so because it is usually more strai-
ghtforward to reallocate highway or road funds from 
one region to another than it is to redistribute wealth 
through public consumption or employment policies 
(Sollé Ollé, 2010: 297). In Argentina, the federal 
executive can reallocate budget items approved by 
congress, making use of the so-called executive “ex-
traordinary powers.” In Brazil, the president has the 
final decision over the budget law, which is approved 
by congress but is not mandatory. Because of this 
discretion, we demonstrate that loyal districts are 
advantaged in the distribution of federal outlays. In 
Argentina, districts loyal to the president receive on 
average almost 60% more infrastructure funds than 
those loyal to the opposition, a share which is 20.4% 
in Brazil. Interestingly, these figures are much larger 
than what the literature has found for general federal 
spending in the U.S.6 and even in other comparative 
studies, such as India.7
This work is both a theoretical contribution and an 
empirical one. We contend that distributive politics 
is mainly a matter of presidential decision. We claim 
that presidents prefer to invest in districts where 
their party is strongest, not to shore up swing areas, 
and certainly not to waste money where the party 
does not have a chance. Although this argument 
stresses the relevance of partisan links, it does not 
identify which partisan links are relevant to explain 
distributive outcomes: it may be those between pre-
sidents and federal legislators, national and regio-
nal party leaders, federal ministers or high-ranking 
federal officials and state politicians, or between 
presidents and governors. We test the relevance of 
the different linkages for which we have data and 
show variation in the amount of non-earmarked 
funds that allied districts receive. Our empirical fin-
dings indicate that there is a large variation in the 
relevance of the partisan links between presidents 
and governors and the influence of congress and 
its committees. Furthermore, we observe that the 
timing of elections is not relevant in explaining dis-
tribution and that presidents are mostly motivated 
by political considerations, so that programmatic 
factors such as equity or efficiency criteria play a se-
condary role. We discuss some possible reasons for 
these results and their implications for the broader 
comparative debate on distributive politics.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we discuss 
the theoretical literature on distributive politics and 
present our main theoretical claim. Second, we ope-
rationalize the variables and provide the data sour-
ces for the main and competing hypotheses. Third, 
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we introduce the methodological approach selected 
to analyze the data. In the last two sections, we put 
forth the empirical findings and discuss them.
 
The Role of Congress, Presidents,  
and Governors in Distributive Politics
 
Students of the U.S. congress have long studied 
whether individual representatives, delegations and 
committee composition have a significant effect on 
the distribution of federal funds. In an early work, 
Ferejohn (1974) demonstrated that members of the 
Appropriation and Public Works committees directed 
more funds to their districts. But since that work, the 
empirical results of studies on the relevance of com-
mittees have been mixed (Berry et al., 2010: 784; 
Kriner and Reeves, 2012: 349). One side of the litera-
ture has found that larger delegations and committee 
membership affect federal distribution (Holcombe 
and Zardkoohi, 1981: 397; Grossman, 1994: 299), 
but several other studies have found mixed results for 
this claim (Lee, 2000; Atlas et al., 1995; Balla et al., 
2002; Bickers and Stein, 2000).
More recently, some studies have begun to explore 
the influence presidents have over the allocation of 
federal outlays (Larcinese et al., 2006; Berry et al., 
2010). But there is little agreement on how presi-
dents influence the distribution of federal outlays. 
Some argue presidents influence the budgetary pro-
cess by following electoral expectations: they allo-
cate more funds in districts were they expect larger 
electoral benefits and returns. Those districts that 
are not expected to generate electoral or political 
returns will be excluded from federal non-earmarked 
investment. Dixit and Londregan (1996: 1133) de-
nominate this “pork-barrel” or “machine politics.” 
Lindbeck and Weibull (1987: 289) argue that in cases 
of voters with identical consumption preferences but 
with observed differences in party preferences be-
tween groups, parties in a two-party system will favor 
groups with weak party preferences, i.e., “marginal 
voters.” An implication of this claim is that, under the 
abovementioned conditions, presidents will spend 
funds in swing districts (those with a high proportion 
of relatively unattached voters or in which the incum-
bent won or lost by a narrow margin) because these 
regions have larger electoral weight than secure ones 
(Sollé Ollé, 2010: 300; Persson and Tabellini, 2000). 
Some studies have found empirical evidence from 
the U.S. to support this claim (Wallis, 1989; Wright, 
1974) as have some comparative analyses (Magaloni 
et al., 2007: 202; Brollo and Nannicini, 2012: 742; 
Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002).
In contrast, Cox and McCubbins (1986) argue that the 
optimal strategy for risk-averse candidates is to dis-
tribute to their reelection constituency and over-in-
vest in their closest supporters to maintain existing 
political coalitions. Several authors have supported 
this claim with empirical evidence from the U.S. (Car-
sey and Rundquist, 1999; Levitt and Snyder, 1995) 
and from comparative experience (Arulampalam et 
al., 2009). There are several theoretical reasons why 
presidents may target funds to their reelection cons-
tituency. For Cox and McCubbins, cooperation betwe-
en the president and members of congress is enhan-
ced when one is the party leader and the others are 
her copartisans. The president could also target core 
supporters to further his legislative agenda by direc-
ting spending to specific legislators (McCarty, 2000). 
Or it may be that the federal administration prefers 
to allocate funds to governors with the same policy 
preferences (Larcinese et al., 2006: 448). 
In Latin America, most presidential systems put lar-
ge powers and responsibilities in the hands of pre-
sidents. Presidents in Latin America can introduce 
bills, veto laws, legislate by decree during emergen-
cies, and have preeminence in the making of annual 
budgets (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997; Shugart 
and Carey, 1992). As a result, presidents have been 
endowed with larger legislative powers to get their 
policy agenda passed (Pereira and Melo, 2012) and 
this has helped the executive to win greater leve-
rage vis-à-vis the legislature over time (Mustapic, 
1997). Constitutional reforms after the third wave 
of democratization have systematically enlarged 
presidential agenda power (Negretto, 2009). 
The main implication of this increase in presidential 
powers over time for our study is that distributive 
politics is mainly thought as a matter of presidential 
decision and struggles between presidents and con-
gress. The literature on distributive politics, both in 
the U.S. and comparative settings, has mainly con-
centrated on the relationships between presidents 
and legislatures, paying less attention to the role 
other strong political actors, particularly state go-
vernors in developing federations, play in the poli-
tics of distribution in federal cases.8 
Extensive literature on Argentina has found that go-
vernors are usually the undisputed (or at least the 
dominant) bosses of the provincial-level party. When 
the governor is powerful, the provincial party is key 
in mobilizing the vote and consolidating the base of 
political support for politicians and parties (Jones 
and Hwang, 2005: 121-123; De Luca et al., 2002). 
But governors are not only crucial for electoral mo-
bilization; they are also critical to build up legisla-
tive support for presidents in the federal congress. 
Jones (2002: 159-167) claims that the provincial-
-level party in Argentina, and to a lesser extent the 
national-level one, has a great deal of control over 
a legislator’s access to the ballot and his position in 
the party lists for the federal legislative. Due to the 
closed-list proportional representation electoral 
system, governors are decisive in defining the list of 
candidates for their party tickets, so they exercise a 
decisive influence over provincial delegations in the 
federal congress (Jones, 2002; Jones and Hwang, 
2005). Consequently, Argentine presidents need to 
negotiate not only electoral but also legislative sup-
port with governors, especially those in their coali-
tion. Despite the relevance associated to governors 
for electoral mobilization in their districts as well as 
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in the national arena to build up legislative support 
for presidents in Argentina, there is little empirical 
evidence on their influence on federal distributive 
politics.9 We seek to empirically address this lacuna 
in the literature.
Research on Brazil has shown much debate on whe-
ther and how much governors mobilize the vote du-
ring elections and how much they influence federal 
legislative politics. Some scholars claim that gover-
nors are indeed influential (especially before 1994) 
due to the centrifugal configuration of Brazilian fe-
deral institutions, electoral laws such as the open-list 
proportional representation system (which weakens 
party leadership and promotes fragmentation and 
regionalization of the party system), the decentra-
lized organization of national parties, the powers 
governors have over policymaking, their control of 
resources for patronage and pork, and the influen-
ce governors have over career prospects for federal 
legislators. Together, these factors have allowed 
governors to strengthen their state party machines 
(Abrucio, 1998; Mainwaring, 1999; Ames, 2001; Sa-
muels, 2003; Desposato, 2004; Ames et al., 2005; 
Alston et al., 2009; Borges, 2011) and influence fe-
deral politics during the transition to democracy (Ha-
gopian, 1996; Abrucio, 1998; Mainwaring, 1999), its 
constitutional reform (Souza, 1997), and during the 
1990s economic policy changes (Mainwaring, 1999; 
Samuels, 2003; Samuels and Mainwaring, 2004).
Others contend that several factors account for the 
decisive influence of presidents and national parties 
over federal politics, both in the electoral and the 
legislative arena, and the increasingly weakening of 
governors’ influence since the 1988 constitutional 
reform and especially since 1994: from the institutio-
nal (legislative) powers of the president and the cen-
tralized legislative organization in congress (Cheibub 
and Limongi, 2002; Figueiredo and Limongi, 2000), 
more federal social spending and thus a diminished 
resource base for state-level patronage (Hagopian et 
al., 2008; Zucco, 2008; Borges, 2011), to structural 
factors such as pro-poor growth that favored the Left 
and eroded conservative parties’ support, especially 
in the most backwards regions of the country (Mon-
tero, 2009), and the lack of prerogatives for redesig-
ning electoral districts as provincial governments do 
in Argentina (Calvo and Micozzi, 2005; Borges, 2011; 
Gibson, 2013). In this paper, we do not attempt to 
solve this controversy but rather to provide fresh em-
pirical evidence on whether presidents, congress, or 
governors are relevant actors (and if so, how much in 
comparison to other cases) in influencing distributi-




We hypothesize that presidents will invest little or 
nothing in opposition states in Brazil and provinces 
in Argentina (henceforth districts), somewhat more 
in swing ones, and more still in their core ones. 
Although this argument stresses the relevance of 
partisan links, it does not allow us to test which 
partisan links are relevant to explain distributive 
outcomes: it may be those between presidents and 
federal legislators, national and regional party le-
aders, federal ministers or high ranking federal 
officials and district-level politicians,10 or between 
presidents and governors. We empirically test the 
influence of the different linkages for which we have 
data over the federal distribution of non-earmarked 
funds and claim that districts governed by allied go-
vernors should receive more federal investment. 
Districts are classified into those belonging to the 
opposition (which are expected to receive few fun-
ds, if any), swing districts (which are expected to 
receive somewhat more money), and core districts, 
or those aligned in partisan terms (which are expec-
ted to receive the largest share of funds) (See Table 
3). The variable swing measures the difference be-
tween the incumbent governor’s share of votes and 
the share of votes of the main opposition party. The 
variable core ally is a dummy variable that classifies 
how politically linked governors are to the presi-
dent. It is coded as 1 if presidents and governors are 
in the same governing coalition in a given year; 0 
otherwise (Model 1a).11 We also interact the swing 
and the core variables to analyze whether the effect 
of swing depends on how the sub-national govern-





We are primarily interested in testing the role of 
presidential politics and the political linkages be-
tween the president and governors, but we also in-
corporate the role of congress and its committees, 
elections, and programmatic determinants to test 
the relevance of alternative claims. 
We want to test the relevance of congress in affec-
ting the distribution of federal funds in both cases. 
Following the literature on the topic, we test whe-
ther provinces or states with more representatives 
in core committees (committee) and with larger de-
legations from the president’s party (delegation) in 
congress are more likely to receive more funds (Mo-
del 2a).13 We included an interaction term to test 
the effect of the district’s congressional delegation 
conditional on the governor being a presidential 
ally (Model 2b). 
We also examine whether overrepresented districts 
tend to receive more federal grants per capita, as 
several previous studies have found (Holcombe and 
Zardkoohi, 1981; Atlas et al., 1995; Lee, 2000; Rod-
den, 2010; Samuels and Snyder, 2001; Gibson et al., 
2004; Gibson and Calvo, 2000). Some scholars ex-
pect this because the political benefits from a margi-
nal monetary unit of increased grants to a small and 
overrepresented district are greater than a marginal 
unit of increased grants to a large one in which the 
per capita impact is smaller.14 This paper furnishes 
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further evidence to the discussion including this va-
riable as a control in the different models. 
In addition, we test whether governors are more li-
kely to receive more infrastructure investment du-
ring presidential election times (as well as during 
legislative and gubernatorial elections in the case 
of Argentina; see below) (Model 3). 
We also control for programmatic variables. Pro-
grammatic distribution comprises public goods 
entitled through formal rules that effectively shape 
the distribution of benefits (Stokes et al., 2013). 
The central government distributes programma-
tically when it follows certain ideological beliefs 
about equality or efficiency. According to equity-
-oriented arguments, a government committed to 
maximizing a nationwide social welfare function 
allocates grants among districts to compensate 
for the effects of an uneven distribution of wealth 
across the territory of a given country or to provi-
de for those that are especially in need (Grossman, 
1994: 295). Hence, we expect that the lower the per 
capita GDP, and the higher the poverty level in the 
district, the more infrastructure funds the district 
will get. For efficiency-oriented claims, funds will 
flow to those districts in which infrastructure pro-
jects’ relative impact is higher. Districts with larger 
urbanization rate, population density, numbers of 
cars, industrial production, and larger gross geo-
graphic product (GGP), should be more likely to re-




We test the different hypotheses in the three main 
models (1 to 3) and in a full model (4) using diffe-
rent sources of data to track the geographic spen-
ding of infrastructure funds over a decade in the two 
cases. These are the largest panels of infrastructure 
data spending ever assembled for the cases studied. 
For Argentina, we use original data on federal go-
vernment infrastructure spending between 1999 
and 2009 collected from the National Budget Office. 
15 Total infrastructure funds include transfers from 
the central government to the provinces from ei-
ghteen budget programs of the Ministry of Federal 
Planning, Public Works, and Services. All values are 
reported in thousands Argentine Pesos (AR$), per 
capita, in constant values, and transformed into the 
natural logarithm to normalize the data.16
For Brazil, we use data from the Secretariat of the 
Treasury and the federal Senate, for the years 2001-
2011.17 Total infrastructure spending in this case in-
cludes variables on housing, sanitation, roads, and 
urban works. The data are reported in the natural 
logarithm of thousand Brazilian Reais (R$) per capi-
ta, in constant values.18
We test the effects of the different models using an 
OLS regression with panel corrected standard errors 
(PCSE; Beck and Katz, 1995), which computes the 
variance-covariance estimates and the standard er-
rors assuming that the disturbances are heteroske-
dastic and correlated across panels.
As in previous works on the subject (Huber et al., 
2008:428), we do not include provincial or state 
dummies in our study. In a recent work, Clark and 
Linzer (2014) recommend random effects models 
for panels with features like ours, that is, when va-
riation is observed mainly between units (not much 
into them over time), when there are relatively few 
observations per unit, and if some independent 
variables that change little over time (such as po-
pulation and GDP per capita) are highly correlated 
with the district dummies. Under these conditions, 
the authors recommend using the random effects 
estimator because results are better than in the fi-
xed effects estimator. Plumper et al. (2005: 330-34) 
and Huber et al. (2008: 429) recommend the same, 
as the inclusion of district dummies eliminates the 
cross sectional variance, makes it impossible to es-
timate the effect of exogenous time-invariant va-
riables, and severely skews the estimated effects of 
partially time invariant variables.
Table 1. PSCE Results, Argentina.
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Observations 165 165 150 84 149 130
R2 0.44 0.50 0.43 0.46 0.52 0.54
Cross-sectional 
units
24 24 24 24 24 24
 
Unstandardized regression coefficients. Standard errors in parenthesis. *p<0.100 **p<0.050 ***p<0.010
Dependent variable: Natural logarithm of per capita federal government investment in public works, in thousand Argentine 
Pesos, deflated using INDEC’s construction index prices. 
Table 2. PSCE Results, Brazil






  -0.588* 
(0.342)






















  -0.124*** 
(0.033)
Delegation







23RIEL — REVISTA IBERO-AMERICANA DE ESTUDOS LEGISLATIVOS :: N.4 :: MAI :: 2015 :: RIO DE JANEIRO :: FGV
Table 2. PSCE Results, Brazil


































































































Observations 267 267 195 187 275 188
R2 0.53 0.53 0.60 0.61 0.58 0.63
Cross-sectional 
units
27 27 27 27 27 27
 
Unstandardized regression coefficients. Standard errors in parenthesis. *p<0.100 **p<0.050 ***p<0.010
Dependent variable: Natural logarithm of per capita federal government investment in public works, in thousand Reais, 
deflated using IBGE’s construction index prices.
Empirical Findings
 
We attain noteworthy empirical results that sup-
port some of our main theoretical expectations. 
In a sign of the relevance of presidential politics, 
federal executives tend to allocate more infras-
tructure investment to districts controlled by go-
vernors who are close partisan allies (Model 1a). 
Ceteris paribus, in Argentina and Brazil allied sub-
-national units received substantially more funds 
than opposition districts. All coefficients are ro-
bust, positive, and statistically significant. The co-
efficient for Argentina is almost three times larger 
than in Brazil (0.865 for Argentina and 0.277 for 
Brazil), indicating that partisan links in the former 
case are much more relevant in accounting for fe-
deral distribution than in the latter.19 
Provinces and states are also more likely to get more 
funds if they are electorally secure and not swing 
districts, when controlling for third variables. They 
get more funds when the difference between the 
share of votes of the governor and the main party 
in the opposition is larger (that is, when the value 
of the variable swing increases). Once again, the co-
efficient for Argentina is larger than for Brazil, but 
not by as much as in the previous variable (0.870 
versus 0.667) (Model 1a).
As indicated before, this argument tests the re-
levance of partisan alignments but it does not in-
dicate which partisan links are relevant to explain 
distributive outcomes. To capture this, we also inte-
racted swing and core to analyze whether the effect 
of swing depends on how the sub-national govern-
ment is politically connected with the federal gover-
nment (Model 1b). Results for Argentina reveal this 
interaction term is both very robust and statistically 
significant. Presidents favor more secure provinces 
controlled by allied governors in Argentina. The in-
teraction term in Brazil is statistically insignificant 
and moves in the opposite direction than expected. 
Despite this, the coefficients for allied and secure 
districts move as expected. Allied and secure states 
tend to receive more funds in this country. This in-
dicates that presidents compensate secure districts, 
irrespectively of them being in the core of the presi-
dential coalition.
Larcinese et al. (2006: 452, 454) also found that 
presidents engage in tactical distribution of federal 
funds to the states in the U.S.: their results show 
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there is a presidential ideological bias toward safe 
states and the alignment between the president 
and the governor is a substantial factor in explai-
ning the allocation of federal moneys. Berry et al. 
(2010: 791, 792) found a similar partisan bias in the 
allocation of federal spending at the congressional 
district and county levels. These findings are similar 
to what Díaz Cayeros (2006: 139) and Arulamparam 
et al. (2009) found in Mexico and India respectively.
Results also indicate that infrastructure distribution 
in Argentina is mainly decided by the national and 
provincial executives and not the federal legislatu-
re (Model 2a).20 These findings are consistent with 
those of Berry et al. (2010: 795) for the U.S. Regres-
sion results for Brazil also indicate that congressio-
nal committees do not affect the outcome, but con-
gressional delegations do matter. The coefficient for 
this variable is robust and statistically significant: 
holding other variables constant, a one percent in-
crease in the share of the legislative delegation of a 
given state is associated with a 616 percent increa-
se in transfers to it in Brazil.21 This coefficient may 
seem high, but we must interpret it bearing in mind 
that the average Brazilian state contributes 3.4 per-
cent of the deputies in the federal legislative coali-
tion.22 Hence, a one percent increase in this variable 
is a substantial change. These results are similar to 
Grossman’s (1994: 299) findings for the U.S., where 
larger legislative majorities of the Democratic Party 
(the party in government at the federal level at the 
time) were empirically associated with larger grants 
to Democratic districts. The relevance of congres-
sional delegations in the allocation of public works 
has also been stressed by the literature on Brazi-
lian legislative politics. Individual and collective 
amendments are the key negotiating tool between 
presidents and legislators and a mechanism throu-
gh which the president crafts legislative support 
in exchange for pork in both chambers of congress 
(Alston and Mueller, 2005; Pereira and Mueller, 
2002; Raile et al., 2011). Our results provide further 
evidence in favor of these arguments.
We also interacted the share of the legislative dele-
gation with the variable core ally. This interaction 
is quite robust and statistically significant in Brazil. 
It does not reach the standards of statistical signi-
ficance in Argentina (where it also moves in the op-
posite direction than expected) (Model 2b). These 
results highlight another major difference between 
the results for Argentina and Brazil, namely, that 
congress is a key arena for negotiations in the latter 
case and less so in the former.
Other institutional variables do not receive empiri-
cal support in the regressions we run. Presidential 
election years do not seem to contribute explai-
ning the allocation of infrastructure investment in 
either of the cases. More funds are not transferred 
to governors during (federal or state) election ti-
mes (Models 3a and 3b). We also lagged presidential 
election one year and the results remain the same.23
The coefficient for overrepresentation is statisti-
cally significant in most models in Argentina and 
Brazil. These findings are consistent to what several 
authors reported in their studies on the U.S. and the 
European Union (see Atlas et al., 1994; Lee, 2000; 
Rodden, 2002). Despite being statistically signifi-
cant, the coefficient is always smaller than the one 
for our main independent variables. We have also to 
bear in mind that the average overrepresentation 
index in the lower chamber for Argentina is 1.9 and 
1.8 for Brazil, and that the standard deviation for 
both cases is around 2. Hence, a one percentage 
point increase in the index is a major change that 
does not seem to produce substantial changes in 
the dependent variable, especially when compared 
to the main variables in our model.
We also found that, ceteris paribus, the main con-
trols according to programmatic distribution get ra-
ther mixed empirical support (Model 4). Most of the 
efficiency criteria are not relevant factors to explain 
the allocation of infrastructure funds in the two ca-
ses. Only urbanization rate moves as expected and 
receives empirical support in Brazil. In Argentina, 
the statistically significant criteria move in the op-
posite direction than expected: more industrialized 
provinces receive less federal infrastructure funds. 
We cannot reach conclusions in relation to popula-
tion and per capita GGP due to inconsistencies in the 
results. In this country, there is also weak support 
for some of the equity criteria: only in two out of six 
models is poverty significant and moves in the ex-
pected direction. 
In Brazil, states with a larger share of poor people 
receive fewer funds but so do richer states in terms 
of per capita GDP. Combined results for poverty and 
income in Brazil seem to indicate that more overre-
presented, less populated, middle and lower income 
states with fewer average poor households received 
more public works. Northern and Midwest states are 
the ones that resemble those structural characte-
ristics. In effect, basic descriptive statistics indica-
te that these are the states that have benefited the 
most during the period of analysis.24
Including the main variables in a single, fully specified 
model25 does not change the results substantially, as 
most of the key variables remain the same. The core 
variable remains robust and statistically significant in 
the two cases (although the swing variable loses sta-
tistical significance both in Argentina and Brazil).
The R-squares in the main models oscillate between 
0.43 for Argentina and 0.63 in Brazil. Although di-
fferences across models are not large, we show that 
our main model has more robust and statistically 
significant coefficients that move in the expected 
direction, something which is not always the case 
in most competing models. These R-squares also 
indicate that we still need better theories, data, 
and models to account for the factors that affect 
the allocation of non-earmarked federal investment 
beyond the ones we included in our study. Case stu-
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dies can also contribute to a better understanding 




The results provide evidence supporting the argu-
ment that presidents in Argentina and Brazil are 
crucial actors in distributive politics and that they 
distribute following partisan considerations: they 
distribute more funds to allied districts. But the 
empirical evidence out of the comparative analysis 
reveals that the channels through which partisan 
alliances work seem to be different in the two cases. 
On the one hand, the partisan alignments between 
presidents and governors are almost three times 
more relevant in Argentina than in Brazil (on ave-
rage). On the other, while the federal congress does 
not seem to shape the outcome in Argentina, it is 
important in Brazil. In this case, the share of legis-
lators from a given state in the president’s congres-
sional delegation is a significant factor influencing 
the allocation of federal public works.
How can we explain the differences between Argen-
tina and Brazil? Why are governors more relevant in 
Argentina and congressional delegations more in-
fluential in Brazil? 
We can only risk some hypotheses that need to be 
further developed and analyzed systematically. 
In Argentina, as the literature on the topic shows, 
governors have a large influence over the forma-
tion of legislative party lists and exercise a deci-
sive influence over provincial delegations in the 
federal congress (Jones, 2002; Jones and Hwang, 
2005). Consequently, presidents need to negotiate 
legislative support with governors, especially tho-
se in their coalition. Moreover, presidents depend 
on governors (and sometimes even on influential 
mayors) as they are more effective in mobilizing the 
electorate and building up federal electoral support 
than national party delegates. As a result, some re-
gions of the country may receive federal funds not 
only from their congressional representatives doing 
constituency service. Presidents may also compen-
sate governors for their territorial political support 
and their capacity to deliver votes and seats.
In relation to the differences in the relevance of 
congress, one possible answer could point out to 
the degree of concentration of political power in 
the hands of the president and the need to build up 
legislative coalitions. When presidents get enough 
political support from their own parties (in terms 
of seats and discipline) to pass crucial legislation 
in congress, they may have fewer incentives to form 
broad legislative coalitions, especially under con-
ditions of fiscal and economic urgency (O’Donnell, 
1994). Under those circumstances, presidents 
would be more likely to concentrate decisions on 
how to distribute and to force cooperation from the 
legislature. On the contrary, when presidents do not 
get enough political support from their own par-
ties and need to build up legislative coalitions with 
other parties, congress will be more likely to play a 
more relevant role. After all, this is the crucial arena 
for inter-party bargaining. Presidents in Argentina 
have received 2.5 times more support in congress 
from their own parties in the period under study 
than in Brazil (42.4 percent versus 17.2 percent). 
Hence, they have been the main political actors 
in deciding the distribution of federal funds (with 
little influence from congress, as the data shows). 
Brazilian presidents, on the contrary, have been for-
ced to give congress a larger clout in this process.
Another major difference between the two cases is 
the clear predominance of partisan variables in Ar-
gentina, while these variables interact with some 
programmatic considerations in Brazil. The empi-
rical analysis shows that Brazilian presidents have 
been investing in political allies mainly in the North 
and Midwest states.26 Most of these states are con-
trolled by allied governors, but these are also the re-
gions in which the federal government is promoting 
the expansion of agricultural production and cons-
tructing infrastructure to take farm commodities to 
the main ports for shipment to global markets.
Why does Brazil seem to be more programmatic than 
Argentina? Why does Argentina not seem to clearly 
follow equity or efficiency criteria in the distribu-
tion of federal infrastructure spending? Although 
more research is clearly needed to give satisfactory 
answers to these questions, possible clues could 
point to some usual suspects: institutions, parties, 
or the bureaucracy. It may well be that the president 
has formal rules that allow him/her more discre-
tion in Argentina than in Brazil. In Argentina, the 
president has legal authority to reallocate budget 
transfers. This discretion has been used to form 
and sustain crucial territorial governing coalitions, 
to some extent crafted through the distribution of 
public infrastructure spending. The question would 
be, then, why does Argentina have these rules and 
not Brazil? It may also well be that Brazil has more 
programmatic parties in government (the Workers 
Party) than Argentina (the Justicialista Party, whi-
ch is more ideologically heterogeneous and more 
fragmented territorially), and this obviously in-
fluences programmatic decisions in government. Or 
we can also point to the state and its bureaucracy, 
and claim that merit-based bureaucratic planning 
offices in Brazil have more say and influence over 
presidential decisions than in Argentina. 
Clearly more research is needed to support all 
these clues. On the one hand, more large-sample 
comparative analyses could provide further empi-
rical evidence on why and how relevant governors 
and congress are at influencing the distribution of 
discretionary transfers. On the other, more case 
studies could shed light on the causal mechanisms 
connecting partisan links and distributive politics, 
particularly between presidents, governors, legisla-
tors, as well as national and regional party leaders, 
and federal ministers or high ranking federal offi-
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cials and state politicians (which we could not test 
due to the lack of data).
All in all, and despite the differences between the 
two cases, we found that presidential politics is 
critical in influencing the distribution of federal in-
frastructure. We believe this is an important finding 
that may have profound implications not only for 
the politics of distribution but also for development 
strategies in developing federal democracies.
Table 3. Variables and Data Sources
ARGENTINA
Variables Description Source Years
Public Works 
Investment 
Federal government investment in public works from 18 budget 
programs of the Ministry of Federal Planning, Public Works, and 
Services, per capita, in thousand Argentine Pesos, deflated using 
INDEC’s construction index prices (ICC).
“Consulta para el Ciudada-
no” website, National  
Budget Office (ONP),  
Ministry of Economy.
1999-2009
GGP per capita 
(log)
Natural logarithm of per capita gross geographic (provincial)  
product, in constant 1993 Argentine Pesos.
1983-1992: Consejo Federal 
de Inversiones (CFI);  
1993-1997: SAREP, INDEC. 
1998-2009: National  





Natural logarithm of gross geographic (provincial) industrial  
output, in constant 1993 million Argentine Pesos (producers’ price).




Percentage of households with basic needs unsatisfied.  
Census data (extrapolated for the series).
National Institute of Statis-
tics and the Census (INDEC).
1980, 1991, 2001.
Urbanization rate
Urbanization rate by province. Census data  
(extrapolated for the series).
INDEC. 1980, 1991, 2001.
Population share
Share of national total population for each province.  
Census data (extrapolated for the series).
INDEC. 1980, 1991, 2001.
Population 
density
Inhabitants per square kilometer.  
Census data  (extrapolated for the series).
INDEC. 1980, 1991, 2001.
Cars 
Registered cars by province  
(data for December 31, 2007; extrapolated for the series).
National Register of Vehicle 
Ownership, Ministry of  
Justice and Human Rights.
2007 
Core district
Dummy variable to account whether a provincial governor  
is from the same party of the president.
Authors’ calculation  




Dummy variable to account whether a provincial governor’s  
party is a member of the president’s coalition.
Authors’ calculation  




Difference between the incumbent’s share of votes and that  
of his provincial runner up in the last election.
Authors’ calculation  





Dummy variable to account whether a provincial governor  
is from an opposition party to the president.
Authors’ calculation  





Number of national deputies from a certain province that are mem-
bers of the Budget and Appropriations (1) and Public Works (2) 
Committees in the Chamber of Deputies.




Share of national deputies from a certain province  
that belong to the President’s party.
Legislative Information  





Proportion of national deputies from a certain  
province over the total provincial population.
Loosemore-Hanby Index of 
Electoral Malapportionment 
(Samuels and Snyder, 2001; 
Calvo and Murillo, 2004) 
and electoral data from the 
Ministry of the Interior. 
1983-2008
Electoral Year
Dummy variable indicating whether presidential elections  
were held in a given year.
Authors’ calculation  
based on data from the 
Ministry of Interior.
1983-2009
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Table 3. Variables and Data Sources
BRAZIL
Variables Description Source Years
Public Works  
Investment 
State-level allocation of federal expenditures in  
housing, sanitation, roads, and urban works.
Siga Brasil: Public Budget 
Information System,  
Federal Senate.
2001-2011
GGP per cápita 
(log)
Natural logarithm of per capita gross geographic (state) product,  
in constant 2000 R$, deflated with the National GDP  
Implicit Deflator (IPEA).
2002-2005: Sistema de Contas 
Regionais.  1985-2001: Antigo 




Natural logarithm of gross geographic (state) industrial output,  
in constant thousand R$.




Number of people in households with per capita income below  
the poverty line. IPEA data are in absolute values, converted to 
percentage compared with other countries.
IPEA Data 1980-2005
Urbanization rate
Urbanization rate by state.  
Census data  (extrapolated for the series).
IPEA Data 1980-2005
Population share





Inhabitants per squared kilometer (extrapolated). IPEA Data 1980-2005
Cars  Number of cars in each State (extrapolated). IPEA Data 1999-2009
Core district
Dummy variable to account whether a state governor is  
from the same party of the president.
Authors’ calculation  




Dummy variable to account whether a state governor’s  
party is a member of the president’s coalition.
Authors’ calculation  




Difference between the incumbent’s share of votes and that of his 
state runner up in the last election.
Authors’ calculation  





Dummy variable to account whether a state governor is from an op-
position party to the president.
Authors’ calculation  




Number of national deputies from a certain state that are  
members of the Urban Development Committee (CDU).
Chamber of Deputies 2000-2011
Joint Commitee
Number of national deputies and senators from a certain state  
that are members of the Joint Budget Committee (CMO).
Chamber of Deputies 2000-2011
Delegation
Share of national deputies from a certain state  
that belong to the president’s congressional party.
Chamber of Deputies 2000-2011
Overrepre- 
sentation
Proportion of national deputies from a certain state  
over the total state population.
Loosemore-Hanby Index of 
Electoral Malapportionment 
(Samuels and Snyder, 2001; 
Calvo and Murillo, 2004) and 




Dummy variable to account whether there are  
presidential elections held in a given year.
Authors’ calculation  
based on data from Jairo 
Nicolau’s database.
1985-2011
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4 Central governments have other redistributive tools to correct interpersonal inequality, ranging from subsi-
dies, credits, or tariffs to redistributive social programs, such as conditional income transfers. We concen-
trate on a policy tool crucial to correct territorial inequality.
5 These funds represented almost 8% of the total budget in Argentina in 2006 and almost 3% of the total Bra-
zilian budget in 2011.
6 About 4-5% more in districts and counties represented by members of the president’s party; see Berry et al. 
(2010: 783).
7 Arulampalam et al. (2009) found that a state which is both aligned and swing in the previous state election 
is estimated to receive 16% higher transfers than a state which is unaligned and non-swing.
8 Larcinese et al. (2006) are an exception to this, since they look at the partisan alignment between presidents 
and state governors.
9 Lodola (2005) is an exception to this claim.
10 We cannot test these last two types of links due to the lack of comparable data.
11 We coded them during fieldwork in the two countries based on official electoral data, information from news-
papers, and interviews with provincial experts. 
12 We did not include all variables in a single model due to multicollinearity. 
13 The variable committee reports the number of deputies a given province has on the Budget and Appropria-
tions (Presupuesto y Hacienda) and in the Public Works (Obras Públicas) Committees in the Argentine Chamber 
of Deputies; and in the Urban Development Committee (Comissão de Desenvolvimento Urbano, CDU) and in 
the Joint Budget Committee (Comissão Mista de Planos, Orçamentos Públicos e Fiscalização, or CMO) in Brazil. 
These are the relevant committees because they have authority over the decision to allocate public works. 
The variable delegation is the percentage of legislators in the Chamber of Deputies who are members of the 
majority party.
14 Samuels and Snyder (2001) calculate legislative overrepresentation using the Loosemore–Hanby index of 
electoral disproportionality: Overrepresentation = (1/2) Σ |si–vi|, where si is the percentage of all seats 
allocated to district i, and vi is the percentage of the overall population residing in district I. 
15 Oficina Nacional de Presupuesto (ONP). It is the first time that data on the territorial distribution of public 
infrastructure are systematically gathered for Argentina. We collected these data by reviewing ONP’s official 
documents, for 18 budget programs, for each of the provinces in each year of the series. We received impor-
tant help of several research assistants (including a geographer who georeferenced items).
16  The original data in current Pesos were deflated using the index of construction costs (ICC) reported by IN-
DEC (base year is 1993=100). The models for the two cases were also calculated using the dependent variable 
in U.S. dollars and substantive results remain very similar to those reported.
17 Accessed using Siga Brasil.
18 The original data in current Reais were deflated using the index of construction costs (Índices da Construção 
Civil, ICC) reported by IBGE (base year is 1994=100).
19 Opposition provinces or states, on the contrary, received fewer infrastructure funds on average than the rest 
of the districts. The coefficients for opposition districts in Argentina and Brazil are negative, robust (-0.407 
and -0.135, respectively), and statistically significant in all cases.
20 The number of legislators from a province in the relevant congressional committees and the size of state 
legislative delegations of the governing party in the federal congress do not influence the amount of in-
frastructure funds the provinces receive. We report results for one of the relevant congressional committees 
for each case because results for the other committees are almost identical or very similar: Public Works in 
Argentina and Urban Development Committee in Brazil. Including both variables in the same model does not 
change results.
21 The standard error for this variable is large. We also used the natural log of delegation and substantive re-
sults remain the same.
22 São Paulo has the largest average delegation, with a 20% of the deputies. Some states (Alagoas and Tocan-
tins) had no legislative delegation during the period we analyze, and others had very small shares (of 1%; 
such as Amazonas, Espírito Santo, Maranhão, Paraíba, Piauí, Río Grande del Norte and Sergipe).
23  In Argentina, gubernatorial and provincial legislative elections may not coincide with federal executive and 
legislative elections (each province can fix its own electoral calendar). Therefore, we run different regres-
sions for gubernatorial and for federal and provincial legislative election years. None of these regression 
coefficients reach the standards of statistical significance.
24  The yearly national average in Brazil is R$ 80.40 per capita. Northern states received, on average, R$ 159.10 
per capita, while Midwest states received R$ 105.10 per capita. On the contrary, Northeastern states received 
R$ 48.40 per capita while Southeastern states got R$ 32.50 per capita. That is, they got 79.6 percent less 
funds per capita than the average Northern state. Some possible reasons for these differences are explored 
in the conclusions.
25  We do not include all the institutional variables in the full model due to perfect autocorrelation among some 
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of the variables.
26 The largest recipients in per capita terms in these regions are Roraima (R$334 average per capita during the 
period), Acre (R$259), Tocantins (R$208), Amapá (R$154), Mato Grosso do Sul (R$132), and Mato Grosso 
(R$119); while the least favored states are the Federal District (really a hybrid state/municipality - R$4 per 
capita), São Paulo (R$16), and Paraná (R$22). Out of the six most favored, five have been in the presidential 
coalition most of the time (only Roraima was under control of a coalition led by the PSL in which the PT was 
part and after 2005 under the control of the PSDB in coalition with the PFL; and Tocantins only after 2010 was 
controlled by the opposition PSDB), while among the least favored only the Federal District was controlled 
by the PMDB, the PFL, and the PT only after 2010. There are other several reasons why per capita transfers 
are large in these states (besides political coalition). Roraima is a new state (it was a federal territory until 
1988). The large per capita transfers are largely a result of its very small population (only 450,000 inhabi-
tants) and the coefficients that regulate individual amendments to the budget. Roraima has three senators 
and eight deputies. Given the budget process legislation, each legislator can distribute R$12 million annu-
ally. Therefore, the legal framework grants Roraima a significant amount of resources, independent of poli-
tical coalitions. This pattern is also visible in other small states that were also federal territories until 1988, 
such as Acre and Amapá. Tocantins and Rondônia, although similar in some aspects to the previous states, 
have developed a large agricultural economy and have been recipients of large logistical federal infrastruc-
ture projects.
